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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this paper is to develop 
significant implications for the accounting profession 
based on an in-depth analysis of the fall of energy giant 
Enron Corporation. The paper includes details about how 
the company managed to deceive Wall Street for such an 
extended period of time and, then, present itself as a 
very successful profitable company. The scope of the paper 
also covers the unfolding of certain details about the
accounting scandal surrounding the company and which led 
to its eventual bankruptcy. The paper also includes 
details about the self-regulated accounting profession and 
the changes that affected the profession as a result of
the Enron accounting scandal. This paper specifically
highlights Enron above other companies' failures because
of the huge impact this company had on the existing
self-regulatory financial reporting system.
The paper concludes with recommendations and insights 
based on the author's analysis of Enron's demise. The
paper contains information about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and its impact on the accounting profession; included also
is a survey about the Act and a discussion about the
results of the survey. Appendix A of this paper includes
the 10-questions survey.
iii
This paper is very valuable to all accountants,
especially those practicing in public accounting or those 
working for publicly-traded companies. It is informational
and instructional; it contains valuable educational
information that can be taught in ethical, managerial, and 
accounting classes.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Story of Enron
In 1985, after federal deregulation of natural gas 
pipelines, Enron was born from the merger of Houston 
Natural Gas and InterNorth, a Nebraska pipeline company 
(Thomas, 2002). In the process of the merger, Enron
incurred large debts and, because of deregulation, the 
company lost its exclusive rights to its pipeline. In 
order to survive, the company created a "gas bank" in 
which Enron would buy gas from a network of suppliers and
sell it to a network of consumers, contractually
guaranteeing both the supply and the price as well as
promising to deliver so many cubic feet of gas to a 
particular utility or business on a particular day at 
market price, charging fees for the transactions and 
assuming the associated risks (Thomas, 2 0 02) .
With the deregulation of electrical power markets and
under the direction of former Chairman Kenneth L. Lay,
Enron expanded into being an energy broker trading
electricity and other commodities (O'Harrow, 2002) . Enron
became a giant middleman that worked like a hybrid of 
traditional exchanges. Rather than simply bringing buyers
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and sellers together, Enron entered into the contract with 
the seller and then signed a different contract with the 
buyer, making money on the difference between the selling 
price and the buying price. Enron also kept its books 
closed, making it the only party that knew both prices.
(O'Harrow, 2 0 02) .
Over time, Enron began to design increasingly varied 
and complex contracts. Customers could insure themselves 
against all sorts of risks, such as a rise or fall in 
interest rates, a change in the weather, or a customer's 
inability to pay. Pretty soon the volume of such financial 
contracts far exceeded the volume of contracts to actually
deliver commodities (O'Harrow, 2002). As its services
became more complex and its stock soared, Enron created a 
group of partnerships that allowed managers to shift debt
off the books. In 2003, as the losses from various
partnerships started piling up, some partnerships' losses 
would have to be paid for out of Enron stock or cash, 
bringing the debts back home (O'Harrow, 2 0 02) .
Enron executives and its accounting firm, Arthur
Andersen, had warnings of problems nearly a year before
Enron announced on October 16, 2001 a $638 million loss
for the third quarter of 2001. In Nov. 8, 2001, the 
company announced that it had overstated earnings over the
2
past four years by $586 million and that it was
responsible for up to $3 billion in obligations to various 
partnerships (O'Harrow, 2002) . On November 28, 2001 a $23 
billion merger offer from rival Dynegy Corporation was
dropped after lenders downgraded Enron's debt to junk-bond
status. Wall Street reduced the value of stockholders'
equity by $1.2 billion. In November 30 Enron stock closed 
at an astonishing 26 cents share (Thomas, 2002).
Dozens of lawsuits have been filed against the 
company by an array of pension funds. Dozens more are 
directed at former Chairman Kenneth L. Lay, former CEO 
Jeffrey Skilling, and former Chief Financial Officer 
Andrew Fastow. The suits could take years to resolve. U.S. 
District Judge Lee Rosenthal in Houston says she will 
consider freezing Enron officers' and directors' financial 
assets. On December 2, 2001 Enron filed for bankruptcy 
protection. With $62.8 billions in assets, it became the 
largest bankruptcy case in U.S. history at that time
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
[AICPA], 2002a) [On July 21, 2002 WorldCom filed for 
bankruptcy listing some $107 billion in assets and $41 
billion in debt, on a consolidated basis as of March 31, 
2002] (WPNI, 2002b).
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The day Enron filed for bankruptcy its stock closed 
at 72 cents, down from more than $75 less than a year 
earlier. Many employees lost their life savings and tens 
of thousands of investors lost billions. In early October
2002, former Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow was
charged with securities, wire, and mail fraud as well as 
money laundering and conspiring to inflate Enron's profit 
(WPNI, 2002a). Fastow was also responsible for creating 
thousands of special purpose entities (SPEs); these SPEs
were used by Enron to hide losses and to improve the 
company's credit rating. The following section of the 
paper will go into detail to explain SPEs and how did
Enron use them.
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND
Special Purpose Entities
In order to satisfy credit rating agencies, Enron had 
to make sure the company's leverage ratios were within 
acceptable ranges. Consequently, Andrew Fastow became 
heavily involved in lobbying the ratings agencies to raise 
Enron's credit rating, using different ways to lower the 
company's debt ratio. Reducing hard assets while earning 
increasing paper profits served to increase Enron's return 
on assets (ROA = Estimated Annual Earnings I Total Assets)
and reduce its debt-to-total-assets ratio (Total
Liabilities/Total Assets), making the company more
attractive to credit rating agencies and investors. Enron 
also used "special purpose entities" (SPEs) to access
capital and hedge risk. By using SPEs, such as limited
partnerships with outside parties, a company is permitted
to increase leverage and ROA without having to report debt 
on its balance sheet (Thomas, 2 0 02) .
How Special Purpose Entities Work
The company contributes hard assets and related debt
to an SPE in exchange for an interest. The SPE then
borrows large sums of money from a financial institution
5
to purchase assets or conduct other business without the 
debt or assets showing up on the company's financial 
statements. The company can also sell leveraged assets to 
the SPE and book a profit. To avoid classification of the 
SPE as a subsidiary (i.e., thereby forcing the entity to
include the SPE's financial position and results of 
operations in its financial statements), Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) guidelines require that 
only 3% of the SPE be owned by an outside investor
(Thomas, 2 0 02) .
How Enron used Special 
Purpose Entities
Enron took the use of SPEs to new heights of
complexity and sophistication. The company used SPEs to 
"park" troubled assets that were falling in value, such as
certain overseas energy facilities, the broadband
operation, or stock in companies that had been spun off to
the public. Transferring these assets to SPEs meant their
losses would be kept off Enron's books. To compensate
partnership investors for downside risk, Enron promised
issuance of additional shares of its stock. As the value
of the assets in these partnerships fell, Enron began to
incur larger and larger obligations to issue its own stock
later down the road.
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Enron conducted business through thousands of SPEs.
The two most controversial of them were LJM Cayman LP and 
LJM2 Co-Investment LP, run by Fastow himself (Thomas,
2002). From 1999 through July 2001, these entities paid 
Fastow more than $30 million in management fees, far more
than his Enron salary; supposedly he had the approval of 
the top management and Enron's board of directors. In
turn, the LJM partnerships invested in another group of 
SPEs, known as the Raptor vehicles, which were designed in
part to evade an Enron investment in a bankrupt broadband
company, Rhythm NetConnections (Thomas, 2002).
As part of the capitalization of the Raptor entities,
Enron issued common stock in exchange for a note
receivable of $1.2 billion. Enron increased notes
receivable and shareholders' equity to reflect this
transaction, which violates consolidations rules as
included in generally accepted accounting principles
[GAAP] (Thomas, 2002). Enron failed to consolidate the LJM
and Raptor SPEs into its financial statements when
subsequent information revealed they should have been
consolidated.
Enron used SPEs, and other very complex improper 
accounting transactions in order to keep the stock price 
as high as possible. However, the company's auditing firm,
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Arthur Andersen, is also responsible for failing to 
uncover the accounting fraud committed by the company. The 
following section of the paper will cover details about 
the involvement of Arthur Andersen with the accounting
scandal that surrounded Enron.
Arthur Andersen LLP
Arthur Andersen, one of the nation's largest 
accounting firms, was responsible for auditing the
financial statements of Enron. Enron was the firm's
second-largest client. Andersen, which had the job not 
only of Enron's external but also internal audits for the 
years in question, kept a whole floor of auditors assigned 
at Enron year-round (Thomas, 2002). Andersen was also
responsible for some of Enron's internal bookkeeping. Many
of Enron's internal accountants, controllers, and Chief 
Financial Officers (CFOs) were former employees of Arthur 
Andersen. The job of Arthur Andersen was to make sure
investors could rely on Enron's financial statements, but 
Andersen was also a major business partner of Enron's, 
soliciting and selling millions in consulting services to
Enron.
The collapse of Enron has raised awareness about 
possible conflicts of interest among accounting firms that
8
perform both audits and which also provide consultation 
services for their clients. The stock markets require
listed corporations to be audited by independent
accountants. Critics argue that a firm performing both
functions is not truly independent since well-paid
consulting work can influence auditors to pander to their
clients.
When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
began its investigation of Enron, Andersen was accused and
later found guilty of obstructing justice by destroying 
incriminating Enron-related documents. As a result,
Andersen was no longer able to perform any audit work and 
was forced to close down its operations in the U.S.
effective August 31, 2002 following its conviction in June 
2002 on obstruction of justice charges related to the 
Enron bankruptcy (Goff, 2002).
The History of Self-Regulations 
For the past sixty years, the accounting profession's
system of self-regulations has helped create the most 
respected financial market in the world. Self-regulation 
by the accounting profession started just after the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established 
by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
9
Act of 1934. Congress passed the two new laws in response 
to huge sums of money lost by investors in the stock 
market Crash of 1929 and throughout the Great Depression 
(AICPA, 2002b). The SEC was given statutory authority to 
set accounting standards and oversight over the activities 
of auditors; however, the role of establishing auditing
standards was left to the accounting profession.
Accounting Standards
The SEC had always trusted the private sector in
establishing and improving accounting principles and 
reporting standards. During the period from 1938 to 1959,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) issued fifty-one authoritative announcements that 
became the basis for Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). In 1959, the Accounting principles 
Board (APB), a part-time body, replaced the Committee on 
Accounting Procedures (CAP). During the fourteen-year 
period from 1959 to 1972, the APB issued thirty-one new 
standards (AICPA, 2002b).In 1972, a full-time independent 
body was created outside the AICPA to take on the primary 
responsibility of setting up new accounting standards and 
was called the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB). The FASB operates under the sponsorship of the
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Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), which consists of 
sixteen trustees, twelve of whom are elected by 
representatives of FAF's sponsoring organizations, 
including the AICPA and the American Accounting 
Association. The FAF itself appoints the other four 
members, and also appoints the members of the FASB and its 
advisory council. The method used in appointing the 
members is designed in such a way as to ensure that the 
standard-setting body is independent and kept within the 
private sector (AICPA, 2002b).
Auditing Standards
The American Institute of Accountants, the
predecessor organization of the AICPA, appointed a
standing committee on auditing procedures in 1939; the 
committee issued the first auditing standards (AICPA,
2002b).
Then, in 1941, the committee issued a series of
statements as guidelines for independent auditors and, 
during 1951, the committee consolidated the first 
twenty-four of these pronouncements. In 1972, the 
committee confined all previous rules into a single
presentation, as well as changed the name of the committee
to the Auditing Standards Executive Committee, and became
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the AICPA's senior technical committee charged with 
interpreting Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS).
In 1978, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) replaced 
the Auditing Standards Executive Committee. The ASB has 15 
members, is an entity within the AICPA, and is responsible 
for setting the rules for how the auditor can determine 
whether the information reported in the financial
statements is reasonable and whether it conforms to GAAP.
The ASB is a senior technical committee within the AICPA,
and, therefore, has the authority to make public
statements without clearance from the AICPA Council or the
Board of Directors (AICPA,, 2002b) .
Peer Review
Peer Review is one of the techniques used by the 
self-regulated profession to enhance audit quality; it was 
first introduced as a requirement by the AICPA in 1977.
With the establishment of the division for Certified
Public Accountant (CPA) firms, firms that chose to join
the division agreed to follow certain standards including
peer review every three years.
In 1989, these requirements were made mandatory as
part of a package of across-the-board changes to the
profession's self-regulatory structure enacted by the
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AICPA. The AICPA's bylaws were changed so that all members 
who audit publicly-held companies would be required to 
work for a firm that belongs to the AICPA's SEC Practice
Section (SECPS).
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Practice Section
The SEC Practice Section (SECPS) was created by the 
AICPA in 1977 as a self-regulatory group whose objective
is to improve the practice of CPA firms. The AICPA bylaws 
require that all members who engage in the practice of 
public accounting with a firm auditing one or more SEC 
clients, as defined by AICPA Council, are required to join 
the Section (AICPA, 2002c).
One of the requirements of SECPS membership is a 
review every three years by another accounting firm of 
similar size. The intention of the SECPS peer review 
program is to assure the public that a firm performing 
auditing and accounting services for SEC registrants has 
an effective quality control system that provides
reasonable assurance that its auditors and accountants are
complying with both generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) and generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS).
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The Section currently has approximately 1200 member 
firms, which either audit registrants that file financial 
statements with the SEC or have joined the Section
voluntarily (AICPA, 2002c).
Public Oversight Board
In 1977, the Public Oversight Board (POB) was created
as an independent private sector body charged with
overseeing and reporting on the programs of the SEC
Practice Section (SECPS). The POB was independent from 
both the profession and the regulatory process. It elected
its own board members, hired its own.staff, and developed
its own budget. The POB was responsible for reviewing all
firms with 30 or more SEC audit clients as well as
performing a sampling of about one of every five reviews 
of firms with less than 30 SEC clients (AICPA, 2002b).
The POB was the cornerstone of the self-regulatory 
system that oversees the accounting profession in the 
United States. The main purpose of the POB was to help 
give surety to regulators, investors, and the public that 
audited financial statements of public corporations can be
relied upon to provide an accurate picture of the
financial health of those companies. The SEC at random
inspected a sample of peer review files. The POB used to
14
issue an annual report that makes public all of the POB's 
important actions from the previous year.
After the fall of Enron and as a result of statements
by the Chairman of the SEC, Harvey Pitt, concerning 
proposed changes in the accounting profession's system of 
self-regulation, the members of the Public Oversight Board
announced their intention to terminate the Board's
existence no later than March 31, 2002 (Public Oversight
Board, 2 0 02) . The termination date was extended to May 1,
2002, at which time the POB passed a resolution
terminating the POB effective immediately. At that time, 
the POB members also indicated their preparedness to 
individually, or collectively, offer their advice or other 
assistance in establishing an effective oversight 
mechanism in the private sector for the accounting 
profession that audits public companies. This section 
concludes the history of self-regulation for the 
accounting profession in general; the following section 
will also have information about the history of the 
accounting profession, but will focus on specific issues
related to auditors independence, quality control, and
corporate governance.
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Rotation of Auditors and 
Concurring Review
Other SECPS membership requirements include rotation 
of audit partners and concurring review by a fellow
partner. The rules state that if any audit partner within
a firm that has five or more SEC clients and ten or more
partners has been in charge of an SEC audit engagement for
a period of seven consecutive years, a new audit partner 
must be assigned (AICPA, 2002b). The audit report and 
financial statements of publicly-held companies are also 
subject to a concurring review by a partner other than the 
audit partner-in-charge of the engagement.
Quality Control Inquiry Committee
In 1979, the Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC) 
was established to investigate alleged audit deficiencies
of a firm's quality control systems and to provide
reasonable assurance that firms were complying with 
professional standards by identifying corrective actions 
when appropriate (AICPA, 2002b).
Other SECPS membership requirements mandate that each 
member firm of the SECPS must report to the QCIC any 
litigation or proceedings by a regulatory agency that 
alleges deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of a
current, or former, SEC registrant client. All such
16
reports must be made within 30 days. QCIC investigations 
are normally completed within 5-6 months of the matter 
being reported.
Professional Ethics Division
The AICPA also maintains a professional ethics 
division, responsible for maintaining, interpreting, and 
enforcing the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct and when, 
appropriate, suggesting changes to the Code. The Division 
investigates any allegation of wrongdoing by members made 
by the public, federal or state regulatory bodies, other 
AICPA members, or the QCIC. The division also initiates
investigations if it becomes aware of allegations of 
wrongdoing through media reports, federal or state 
regulatory action (AICPA, 2002b).
Corporate Governance
The fall of Enron highlighted the failure of 
corporate governance in the United States and underscored 
the need for fast - and decisive action to require more
accountability at publicly-held companies. Internal
auditors, the board of directors, senior management, and
external auditors are the foundation on which effective
corporate governance must be built. In order to achieve a 
consistent and effective governance process, all four of
17
these groups must be in place and. be working together. 
These four groups provide an effective system of checks
and balances that melds internal understanding of the
business with independent external assessment.
During the Enron fiasco, fingers pointed to the
system used to select/nominate corporate Directors as full 
of conflicts of interests. The practice in most
corporations in America is that management selects
Director-candidates and help them to be "elected." The 
system does not give the shareholders the opportunity to 
nominate truly independent Director-candidates and assure 
that the names of those candidates will appear on the 
Company's ballot along with those nominated by the
management.
While dependent on management for their longevity,
directors still have a fiduciary duty to all shareholders 
to monitor management's actions. It is an obvious conflict
of interest. Additional conflict of interests are caused
by the existence of a director clique, such as friends, 
colleagues or partners elected for the same board
together, creating the potential for conflicts of interest 
and violating what is supposed to be an independent 
watchdog in Corporate America. Historically, the SEC has 
seldom brought disciplinary actions against outside
18
corporate directors in cases involving accounting 
irregularities (Committee of Concerned Shareholders,
2002).
Due to the many hurdles placed in front of
directors-candidates who are not selected by management, 
institutional investors' occupied with their own interest
and the SEC's reluctance to prosecute lapses of proper
conduct by Directors, Directors had no real concern about
their personal accountability to shareholders.
19
CHAPTER THREE
PROBLEMS
I The collapse of Enron and its aftermath has shaken 
investors' faith in the U.S. capital markets. The 
bankruptcy of Enron has put unprecedented focus on the 
accounting profession and its role in the self-regulatory 
system.jThe external accounting profession (especially, 
the auditing function) and the internal auditing 
professions have come under severe public and governmental 
scrutiny due to a perceived lack of independence and the 
failure to protect the public's interest.
I” Many investors began to exercise a fair amount of 
diligence and became more skeptical to companies whose 
bookkeeping seemed confusing. It is a public knowledge 
that a range of companies, such as America on Line (AOL), 
Tyco, and WorldCom, has become subjected to increasing 
scrutiny^.
In the wake of Arthur Andersen's involvement with the
Enron scandal, the accounting profession faced a major 
credibility crisis. The Enron drama represented the 
systemic failure of the fundamentals in the accounting
profession. The Enron fiasco also served as a wake-up call
for the accounting profession to work closely with the SEC
20
to produce a better regulatory system for auditors of all 
publicly-traded companies.
Problems and Recommendations
Problem # 1 - Impaired Independence
Although the seven-year rotation rule did specify how
long public accounting firms could head auditing for a 
particular company, the SEC never made such a rule 
mandatory. This oversight became very clear in the case of
r
Enron and Arthur Andersen J When Arthur Andersen engaged in 
providing non-audit services to Enron, long-term personal 
relationships were established between Enron and its 
"independent" auditor. Enron paid Arthur Andersen $27
million in 2000 for non-audit consulting services (Katz, 
2001), including fees for "business process and risk 
management consulting^' With this kind of money, the CPA 
firm was preoccupied with the desire to preserve lucrative
contracts with Enron.
Independence is greatly being impaired by conflicts 
of interest when a public accounting firm offers internal
auditing, external auditing, and consulting services to
the same client. This was the case with Arthur Andersen,
which served Enron as both the auditor (internal and
external) and the non-audit financial consultant.
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The issue of impaired independence raised a debate in 
the accounting profession regarding the need for 
limitations on non-audit services, defining non-audit
services, and new standards for independence. The
tradition that was followed in conducting external audits
was that audit firms should rotate audit engagement
partners every seven years in order to remove the risk of
over-familiarity with the client. However, the engagement 
partner may remain in a management position relationship 
with respect to the client, which mitigates the effect of 
the partner rotation.
Proposed Solutions and Recommendations by Different
Parties. As a result of the Enron's debacle,
recommendations were made by the SEC to require mandatory 
rotation of audit firms every seven years. Such rotation 
would provide a number of important benefits.
First, a new audit firm would bring new skepticism 
and a fresh perspective that a long-term auditor may lack. 
Second, auditors tend to rely excessively on prior years' 
working papers, including prior tests of the client's 
internal control structure, particularly if fees are a 
concern. Also, long-time auditors may come to believe that 
they understand the totality of the client's issues, and 
may look at those issues in the next audit as normal
22
rather than staying open to other possibilities. Finally, 
an auditor may place less emphasis on retaining a client 
relationship, even at the cost of a compromised audit, if 
he/she knows that the engagement will end after several
years.
Other recommendations call for banning audit firms
from offering internal audit and certain technology 
consulting services to organizations for which they also 
provide external audit services, or prohibit public 
accounting firms from offering both internal and external 
auditing services for any new clients.
Because not all non-audit services may impair 
independence, some recommendations made by the Institute
of Internal Auditors (IIA) called for the need for a set
of guidelines to assess non-audit services and provide 
auditors and directors with a basis for evaluating the 
degree or risk of impairment of independence caused by
non-audit services.
The relativity of fees for non-audit services to the
audit fee, materiality of the transaction to the financial
statements, the extent of review and approval required to
contract the non-audit service, and the oversight of the
service are some of the factors to consider in the
assessment. Guidelines will begin by specifying the
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non-audit services that simply are not appropriate for the 
external auditor to provide under any circumstances. Also 
a list of non-audit services that may impair the auditor's 
independence should be developed and maintained current as 
marketplace conditions change over time.
The concept of "acting as management or an employee
of an audit client" seems straightforward, but unambiguous
guidance is needed in this area. While it is almost 
universally agreed that the auditor should not take on 
management functions, criteria are needed for determining 
when management functions have been assumed. While action
is necessary with regard to non-audit services, a total 
ban of all extended services is not required. In general, 
extended services can be divided into two categories:
• Non-audit services that by their very nature 
should not be rendered by the organization's
external auditor;
• Non-audit services that may enhance the control 
environment or provide special support to client 
organizations, They generally do not impair
independence.
Services in the second category should be permitted 
so long as (1) the total amount of their associated fees 
are not sufficient to bring the independence of the
24
external auditor into question and (2) so long as there 
are no other managerial or operating considerations that 
hinder independence.
While many non-audit services raise potential
independence issues, there are others for which the 
independent accountant may be well positioned to provide 
valuable non-audit services. The first step in achieving a
solution is to obtain an understanding of what types of 
non-audit services are to be prohibited and what services 
are appropriate—as long as the aggregate fees are not 
excessive. For example, providing an audit client with
consulting services in the area of Human Resources, in
most cases, this type of services does not affect the 
auditor's independence with the client. However, advising 
an audit client with respect to the design of a management 
organization structure constitutes a management function 
that would impair independence.
Evaluation of the Proposed Solutions and 
Recommendations. Audit firm rotation has significant costs
such as:
• Increase in audit failures. According to the 
Public Oversight Board (POB), Commission on 
Auditor Responsibilities, and National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
25
found that audit failures are three times more
likely in the first two years of an audit
(AICPA, 2003a).
• Increased start-up costs. Changing auditors
results in more frequent start-up costs, both
for the auditor and the company.
• Increased difficulties in timely reporting. 
Mandatory rotation makes timely reporting more
difficult because audit firms need to meet a
very short "learning curve" to perform a
rigorous audit.
• Loss of "institutional knowledge." Over
successive audits, audit firms increase
institutional knowledge, such as their knowledge 
of the client's accounting and internal control 
systems and familiarity within the industry in 
which the client operates. These benefits would 
be greatly diminished by mandatory rotation.
Despite all the costs mentioned above related to
rotation of auditors, the benefits to shareholders,
lenders, and the investing public from requiring rotation 
of auditors are by far much higher in value than the
additional cost that may be entailed in connection with a 
new auditor becoming familiar with the client. In fact,
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the AICPA's SEC Practice Section has required lead audit 
partner rotation for decades.
Existing SEC Practice Section membership requirements
provide that a member firm must assign a new audit partner
to be in charge of each SEC engagement that has had
another audit partner-in-charge for a period of seven
consecutive years, and prohibit said incumbent partner 
from returning to in-charge status on the engagement for a 
minimum of two years. The Practice Section requirements 
were adopted after thorough consideration of the effects
of the requirements on SEC clients and their audit firms
(AICPA, 2003a).
The SEC should hold the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board responsible for devising clear criteria 
specifying the types of extended services that are
allowable and not allowable. Then, the SEC should adopt 
and enforce very strict rules prohibiting audit firms from 
offering internal audit and certain consulting services 
that may impair their independence with organizations for 
which they also provide external audit services.
It may not be feasible or appropriate for the 
accounting firm to cease all non-audit engagements (that 
are not already restricted) immediately. The audit client 
may need time to find a new provider of those services,
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allow the accounting firms to complete work in progress, 
and arrange for a smooth transition from one provider to
another.
The effectiveness of all of the above-proposed
recommendations will be greatly impacted by how serious
and how successful is the SEC in implementing and
enforcing the new rules. The SEC is under tremendous
pressure to implement and enforce new rules related to
auditor independence and other rules related to lack of
discipline and quality control for audit firms, which will 
be discussed in detail in the following section of the
paper.
Problem # 2 - Lack of Discipline and Quality 
Control
The self-regulatory financial reporting system was 
lacking sufficient disciplinary process and quality 
monitoring for publicly-traded companies in the area of 
auditing. The SEC was not authorized with disciplinary
power to oversee erroneous, unlawful, or unethical
auditing practices. Publicly-traded companies were not 
required to submit reports on assessment of internal 
controls and risk management processes within 
organizations. When such information is not mandatory to 
be monitored, it allows problems like the ones in Enron to
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grow without being noticed until they snowball into 
disasters. By the same token, due to lack of regularity, 
the program of firm-to-firm triennial peer review for 
auditors of publicly-traded companies does not allow
quality monitoring. A few neglected red flags can grow out
of hand before we realize it.
Proposed Solutions and Recommendations by Different
Parties. On January 2002, the SEC made a proposal to 
restructure the accounting profession's quality monitoring 
and disciplinary processes and strengthen public and 
investor confidence in auditing and financial reporting
(AICPA, 2002d). The recommendations called for the
accounting profession to produce a better regulatory 
system for auditors of publicly traded companies.
The SEC envisioned a new body with two primary 
responsibilities, discipline and quality control. Here are 
some components of the proposed system: The system should 
be subject to a new body that is dominated by public 
membership. The SEC should decide whether conduct should
be pursued as violations of law (in which case the SEC
would handle it), or pursued as violations of ethical 
and/or competence standards (in which case they would be 
handled by the private sector regulatory body). The body 
would also consider complaints regarding public company
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auditors that come from sources other than the SEG (AICPA,
2002d).The body should be empowered to perform
investigations, bring disciplinary proceedings, publicize 
results, and restrict individuals and firms from auditing 
public companies. It would also have the ability to impose
fines. These disciplinary proceedings should proceed
expeditiously and disciplinary actions should be subject
to SEC oversight.
In addition, there should also be a reform of the
current peer review process for SEC registrant that 
re-engineers firm-on-firm review. The new process should
replace the current triennial firm-on-firm peer review for 
auditors of publicly traded companies with more frequent 
monitoring of audit quality designed to produce better 
audits in the future. There should also be a permanent
quality control staff composed of knowledgeable people 
unaffiliated with any accounting firms. The staff should
be deployed and overseen by the new publicly dominated 
body and its staff (AICPA, 2002d).
Evaluation of the Proposed Solutions and
Recommendations. In order to bolster public and investor 
confidence in auditing and financial reporting, there is a 
great need to restructure the accounting profession's 
quality monitoring and disciplinary process. The
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accounting profession has to resolve its vulnerabilities 
and weaknesses. However, on the positive side, the 
accounting profession has actually shown great willingness 
to work with the SEC to produce a better regulatory system
for auditors of publicly-traded companies, especially 
after the Enron's collapse (AICPA, 2002d).
The new system would have to be tough, no-nonsense,
fully transparent, and subject to independent leadership
and governance. In addition, there must be regular
monitoring of the ways in which auditing firms perform
their responsibilities; it is time for a new public
regulatory body responsible for monitoring the quality 
review and discipline in the accounting profession. In 
fact, the AICPA expressed a great support for the creation 
of a new public regulatory organization to undertake
professional discipline and quality review in the
accounting profession. The AICPA described the idea of the
new regulatory organization for auditors of the financial 
statements of public companies as a radical change in the 
accounting profession's landscape (AICPA, 2002e). The
AICPA commented that the proposed changes would go a long 
way toward increasing confidence in the capital market, 
the financial reporting system, and the accounting 
profession (AICPA, 2002e).
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In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Public Law 107-204) 
created a five-member Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB); the next section of this paper will include
information about the new board.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS
AFFECTING THE ACCOUNTING
PROFESSION
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Act, which applies in
general to publicly-held companies and their audit firms,
dramatically affects the accounting profession and impacts
not just the largest accounting firms, but any CPA
actively working as an auditor of, or for, a
publicly-traded company.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a major reform
package mandating the most far-reaching changes Congress
has imposed on the business world since FDR's New Deal 
(Miller & Pashkoff, 2002). It seeks to prevent future 
scandals and restore investor confidence by, among other 
things, creating a public-company-accounting-oversight 
board, revising auditor independence rules, revising 
corporate governance standards, and significantly 
increasing the criminal penalties for violations of
securities laws.
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The Public-Company-Accounting- 
Oversight Board
Accounting firms that audit public companies must
register with the Board (registered firm). The new board's 
operations are subject to direct and substantial SEC 
oversight. The board will issue standards or adopt
standards set by other groups or organizations to be used 
by audit firms as guidelines in auditing public companies. 
These standards include: auditing and related attestation,
quality control, ethics, independence, and "other
standards necessary to protect the public interest." The
Board has the authority to set and enforce audit and 
quality control standards for public company audits
(AICPA, 2002f).
The board will have the authority to regularly 
inspect registered accounting firms' operations and will 
investigate potential violations of securities laws,
standards, competency, and conduct. Sanctions may be 
imposed for non-cooperation, violations, or failure to 
supervise a partner or employee in a registered accounting 
firm. These include revocation or suspension of an 
accounting firm's registration, prohibition from auditing 
public companies, and imposition of civil penalties.
During investigations, the Board can require testimony or
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document production from the registered accounting firm, 
or request information from relevant persons outside the 
firm. Investigations can be referred to the SEC, or with
the SEC's approval, to the Department of Justice, state
attorneys general or state boards of accountancy under
certain circumstances (AICPA, 2002f).
The board will also have an international authority. 
Foreign accounting firms that "prepare or furnish" audits 
report involving U.S. registrants will be subject to the 
authority of the Board. Additionally, if a registered U.S. 
accounting firm relies on the opinion of a foreign 
accounting firm, the foreign firm's audit work papers must 
be supplied upon request to the Board or the Commission.
Comments on the Effectiveness 
of the Board
The creation of the board and making all its 
operations subject to direct and substantial SEC oversight 
represents a change in the self-regulatory accounting 
profession, a change from public oversight to public 
participation. It changes the way the accounting
profession has been regulated, shifting it from a system 
of self-regulation and peer-review to one of independent 
review by a body with investigative and disciplinary
powers.
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The author believes that the creation of this board
is an important step forward to restructure the accounting 
profession and resolve its vulnerabilities and weaknesses. 
However, the board needs to be independent, yet,
knowledgeable enough to have the desired impact. The board
should have the right combination of backgrounds, ranging 
from individuals knowledgeable in the areas of law to 
those in accounting to, those experts in the industry.
The author also believes that one of the most
important functions of the board is to make sure that the
audit committee has real independence and not influenced
by management. In fact, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Congress requires that auditors be hired and supervised by 
company audit committee, not by management (Miller & 
Pashkoff, 2002). Roderick M. Hills, a former SEC chairman, 
highlighted the importance of an independent audit 
committee alleging that in many companies, audit 
committees are still too influenced by management when 
they make such decisions (Reddy, 2003) .
New Rules for Auditor Independence 
and Corporate Governance
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act changed the relationship 
between accounting firms and their publicly-held audit 
clients. Under the new law, auditors will report to and be
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overseen by a company's audit committee, not management. 
Audit committees must preapprove all services (i.e., both 
audit and non-audit services not specifically prohibited)
provided by its auditor. An auditor must report new
Information to the audit Committee. This information
includes: critical accounting policies and practices to be
used, alternative treatments of financial information
within GAAP that have been discussed with management,
accounting disagreements between the auditor and
management, and other relevant communications between the
auditor and management (AICPA, 2002f).
The Act statutorily prohibits auditors from offering
certain non-audit services to audit clients. These
services include: bookkeeping, information systems design 
and implementation, appraisals or valuation services,
actuarial services, internal audits, management and human 
resources services, broker/dealer and investment banking 
services, legal or expert services unrelated to audit 
services and other services the board determines by rule 
to be impermissible. Other non-audit services not banned
are allowed if preapproved by the audit committee.
The Act requires that the lead audit partner and
audit review partner must be rotated every five years on 
public company engagements. Also under the Act, an
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accounting firm will not be able to provide audit services 
to a public company if one of that company's top officials 
(i.e. CEO, Controller, CFO, Chief Accounting Officer,
etc.) was employed by the firm and worked on the company's 
audit during the previous year (AICPA, 2002f).
Comments on the Effectiveness of the 
New Rules for Auditor Independence 
and Corporate Governance
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits all registered 
public accounting firms from providing audit clients, 
contemporaneously with the audit, certain nonaudit 
services including internal audit outsourcing, and expert 
services. The author believes that these scope-of-services 
restrictions go way beyond existing SEC independence 
regulations and they should help improve auditor 
independence. In addition, all other services including 
tax services are permissible only if preapproved by the
audit committee, and in order to hold the audit committee
accountable for all these approvals, the law requires that 
such approvals must be disclosed in the company's periodic 
reports to the SEC.
The new law did improve the auditor independence by 
restricting auditors from offering certain non-audit 
services to audit clients and thus ending a major conflict
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of interest problem when a public accounting firm offers 
internal audit, external audit, and consulting services to
the same client. The law also established new rules for
rotation of auditors and thereby removed the risk of
over-familiarity with the client, and new rules related to 
employment of auditors by the audit client requiring 
mandatory cooling-off period of one year before an auditor 
can take a position at the audit client, improving another 
area of impaired independence (Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2003).
The Act also provides for significant corporate
governance reforms regarding audit committees and their 
relationship to the auditor, making the audit committee 
responsible for the appointment, compensation and 
oversight of the company's auditor (Miller & Pashkoff,
2002) .
The author believes that this will fundamentally 
change the auditor/client relationship. Further, the 
auditor reports directly to the audit committee, not to 
management, and that should reinforce the position that
the auditor's duties are to the shareholders, rather than
management.
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Increasing the Criminal Penalties for 
Violations of Securities Laws
The new law creates tough penalties for those who
destroy records, commit securities fraud, and fail to
report fraud. It is now a felony with penalties of up to 
ten years to willfully fail to maintain "all audit or 
review workpapers" for at least five years (AICPA, 2002f) 
The SEC will establish a rule covering the retention of
audit records and the Board of Accountancy in each state 
will issue standards, that compel auditors to keep other 
documentation for seven years.
Under the new law, it is a felony with penalties of
up to 20 years to destroy documents in a federal or
bankruptcy investigation, criminal penalties for
securities fraud have been increased to 25 years, and the 
statute of limitations for the discovery of fraud is 
extended to two years from the date of discovery and five 
years from the time the fraud was committed (AICPA,
2002f). It was previously one year from discovery and 
three years from the time the fraud was committed.
Other provisions protect corporate whistleblowers, 
ban personal loans to executives, and prohibit insider
trading during blackout periods (AICPA, 2002f). This 
provision will protect employees from becoming victims of
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management. For example in the case of Enron, the company
encouraged employees to invest in the company's stock and
matched their 401(K) contributions with company stock, but 
the company imposed a blackout period and froze the plan
in late October 2001, barring employee sales before the
stock's final plunge. During that blackout period, many
executives were able to sell substantial amount of their
holdings of the company's stock (O'Harrow, 2002).
Comment on the Effectiveness of the 
New Rules Increasing the Criminal 
Penalties for Violations of 
Securities Laws
The Act creates a number of new crimes, including a
new federal offense called "securities fraud." This makes
it a crime to knowingly "defraud any person in connection 
with any security" of a public company or to obtain money 
or property "in connection with any purchase or sale of 
any security" of a public company "by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, presentations, or promises" (Softrax 
Corporation, e-mail, February 20, 2003).
Although the new securities fraud crime is similar in
a number of respects with previous laws on securities 
fraud, it is both broader and the prison term is much 
longer. It carries a maximum of 25 years rather than five 
or ten. The maximum limits on prison terms and fines for
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individuals and companies (fines only) have been sharply 
increased. Other new crimes cover attempts to commit 
fraud, destruction of documents/tampering with evidence in 
anticipation of a governmental investigation, false 
certification of quarterly/annual reports and retaliation 
against whistle-blower (Softrax Corporation, e-mail, 
February 20, 2 0 03) .
The author believes that by substantially increasing 
existing criminal penalties and creating new criminal
penalties for violation of the securities laws and
misconduct relating to fraudulent representations in the 
marketplace, the Act is actually sending a strong message 
to CEOs, CFOs, and other individuals responsible for the 
company's financial information to think twice before 
certifying, the company's financial statements, issuing a 
disclosure or making any presentation, and making sure 
they are communicating accurate information or they will 
face serious consequences.
The increased criminal penalties should help and 
support the new rules relating to corporate governance by 
holding top management and the board of directors 
responsible for their acts. The Act also defines new
crimes, with heavier penalties for destruction of
documents and tampering with evidence, which came as a
42
response to the destruction of documents committed by
Arthur Andersen in anticipation of a governmental
investigation related to the collapse of Enron.
Survey about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Appendix A of this paper includes a survey about the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The survey consists of ten questions 
covering the Act and its impact on the accounting 
profession. The survey was sent to ten CPAs practicing in 
public accounting, or in the industry, with only four 
responses received. While these responses are very 
limited, in the author's opinion, they represent only a 
small sub-sample of issues related to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. To illustrate, one issue concerns section 408 of the
Act, which requires the SEC to conduct "regular and 
systematic" reviews of every public company at least once 
every three years. Therefore, the requirements are not 
realistic for one good reason. The SEC does not, and 
probably will never, have the adequate staff and financial 
means to do so because there are currently about 9,000 
listed companies, and a large number of them are
multi-nationals with very complex structures and financial 
transactions. Another issue involving the Act's 
effectiveness is dealing with the inherited problems of
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the corporate governance. The author learned that there is 
a need for improvements to the Act in order for it to be
more beneficial. For instance, there should be rules
requiring public companies to disclose any change in
auditors. The author believes that new laws are needed to
prevent public companies from dismissing the auditing firm 
and bringing in a new one simply because they do not like 
the auditors position On a certain matter. Anytime a
company wants to change auditors they should disclose to 
the public the reasons for the change. Without this, we 
will continue to see various cases of audit firms giving 
into client requests in order to keep a profitable client.
A similar survey was done using a much larger sample. 
That survey was conducted by Robert Half Management 
Resources, the world's premier provider of senior-level
accounting and finance professionals and covered the same 
subject, but focused more on new corporate governance 
standards mandated by the Act. The survey included
responses from 1,400 chief financial officers (CFOs) from 
a stratified random sample of U.S. private companies with 
more than 20 employees. Fifty-eight percent of CFOs said 
they are implementing new practices in response to these 
regulations. The steps that they reported taking include 
changing their firms' accounting procedures as well as
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enhancing their organizations' internal audit function. 
CFOs were asked, "In light of new corporate governance
standards, what steps has your company taken or plan to 
take to ensure greater control of the accounting
processes?" Among the 58 percent who cited a specific
action, their responses were:
• Review or change current accounting procedures
44%
• Create or expand internal audit function 36%
• Hire an independent firm for consulting work 23%
• Restructure executive compensation plans 8%
• Some other steps 2%.
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is directed toward 
public companies, privately-held and non-profit 
organizations are also scrutinizing financial processes in 
the wake of various corporate scandals. The author 
believes that all companies, publicly-traded, 
privately-held, or non-profit, should have a system of 
internal checks and balance that integrates core business 
functions within a strong corporate governance framework. 
In particular, publicly-traded companies should have a
fully resourced, independent internal audit function that
is professionally staffed. The author also recommends the
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adoption of a uniform set of corporate governance 
principles for publicly-held companies, and encourages a 
mandate for public disclosure related to compliance with 
these principles.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS
What was the most significant event to affect the 
profession in the past fifty years? It was the disclosure 
of Enron's massive manipulation of its financial reporting 
and the fall of one of the nation's most prominent and
respected CPA firm, Arthur Andersen. The impact was felt
at the highest levels of government as legislators engaged
in a large number of debates and accusations. Lawmakers
investigated not only disclosure practices at Enron, but 
for all public companies, concerning SPEs, related party 
transactions and use of "market-to-market" accounting.
Unquestionably, the Enron implosion has wreaked more
havoc on the accounting profession than any other case in 
U.S. history. Critics in the media, Congress, and 
elsewhere called into question, not only the adequacy of 
U.S. disclosure practices, but also the integrity of the 
independent audit process. As a result, President George 
W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law in July 
2002. The Act, which applies in general to publicly-held 
companies and their audit firms, dramatically affects the 
entire accounting profession.
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To Recap all Previous Sections
What Went Wrong
For executives of Enron and for Arthur and Andersen,
part of the problem was simple greed or ignorance. Part of 
the problem was the pressure of a market in which the 
difference of a penny or two in earnings per share could
lead to the difference of a billion or two in market
capitalization. Part of the problem was a failure of some
auditors to step up to their own responsibility, and part 
of it is the financial reporting model itself: the proper 
treatment of many issues is not clear, such as off-balance 
sheet activity. Financial statements are not written in 
plain English and disclosure is periodic. Clearly, part of 
the problem was some inherited weaknesses in disciplinary 
and monitoring processes for the profession, and part of
it is the threat of auditor dependency on fees from major
clients.
The Impact
Beside its dramatic impact on the accounting 
profession, the collapse of Enron also had major impact on 
the company's employees, banks, investors, politicians,
and of course on Arthur and Andersen. Thousands of Enron
employees, many with similar skills, were left unemployed. 
Thousands of employees and retirees have lost almost all
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the value' in their retirement accounts invested in the
company's stock.
One of Enron's biggest lenders, J.P. Morgan Chase, 
announced losses of $456 million as of January 2002 
related to Enron's demise. Citigroup recorded $228 million 
as of January 2002 in Enron-related losses (O'Harrow,
2002). But bank and regulators said the overall impact
would be minimal because no one bank is over invested in
Enron.
Enron's stock lost nearly all its value, dropping 
from almost $34 a share on October 16, 2001 to 26 cents a
share on November 30, 2001. Billions of dollars in stock
value were erased. The stock was delisted from the New
York Stock Exchange on January 15, 2002. Several prominent 
politicians from both parties returned Enron contribution 
money to the company or contributed it to charity. Others 
have been asked about their relationships with Enron. 
Arthur Andersen was found guilty and was convicted in June 
2002 on obstructing justice for destroying Enron-related 
documents. As a result, Andersen was no longer able to 
perform any audit work and in August 2002 was forced to 
close down its operations in the U.S. (Goff, 2002).
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What more Should be done to Restore Public 
Confidence in the Capital Market and in the 
Accounting Profession?
The AICAP is leading an effort to reduce the 
incidence of financial fraud, which requires a team effort 
among auditors, corporate management, and financial 
professionals. The AICPA is working with corporate America 
in designing antifraud programs and controls to be 
implemented by corporations and that CPAs can test and 
report on. The AICPA sponsored a new antifraud summit for 
financial market executives and for corporate America; the 
summit identified new antifraud initiatives and ways to 
collaborate on implementing them.
The AICPA is establishing an Institute for Fraud 
Studies in collaboration with the University of Texas at
Austin and Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. This
new organization will sponsor or conduct research in the 
areas of fraud prevention and detection. The goal is to 
deliver vital information to business and government on 
how to reduce the adverse impact of fraud and to help
investors protect themselves.
To further establish a culture of ethical behaviors,
the AICPA is asking all its members to commit more time to 
fraud detection in their continuing education. The 
institute is also working with academic institutions,
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university accounting programs and college textbook 
publishes to incorporate information about fraud 
prevention and detection in the appropriate education
materials (Castellano, 2002). Additionally, the AICPA is
urging the stock exchange to mandate antifraud training 
for all members of management, boards of directors and
audit committees (Castellano, 2002).There is a need for an
improved reporting model that provide investors with 
timely disclosure of better quality information such as 
off-balance-sheet activity, liquidity, non-financial
performance indicators and unreported intangibles.
Currently the AICPA is working with the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to move toward this kind
of financial reporting model (Castellano, 2002) .
In an effort to promote strong corporate governance,
the AICPA is working with the Auditing Standards Board 
(ASB) to revise existing internal control and reporting 
standards, one of the goals for the new standards is to 
inform the public when the auditor communicates internal 
control weaknesses to the audit committee of a public
company.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is certainly part of 
the solution. It ushers in a new era of corporate 
accountability and public participation in certain areas
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of the accounting profession, but it will take more than 
legislation to increase investor confidence in the capital
markets and in the audit function.
In summary, the author believes that the value of
this project is that it offers an in-depth study and 
analysis of the problems that led to the collapse of
Enron. This paper is unique and different from any other
literature the author read.
The other papers covered only one angle of the
problem with Enron or with the accounting profession, but
this paper did an integration of all angles covering all 
issues whether it is related to accounting, auditing, 
ethics or corporate governance. Then this project provided 
analysis and evaluation of all problems with pros and cons 
for each proposed solution. The paper also covered the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and how this Act attempts to tackle 
those problems. In this matter, the paper is the most 
conclusive report the author has seen covering the fall of 
Enron and the implications of that collapse on the 
accounting profession.
This project could be very valuable to college 
students who major in accounting or finance. It could be 
taught in some accounting classes. It could be also read 
by accounting and audit professionals, especially those
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practicing in public accounting or working for publicly 
traded companies, and finally the report can be useful to 
other people who are interested to know what happened in
the Enron case, such as investors, Enron's employees,
financial advisors, and the interested public in general.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY ABOUT THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
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SURVEY ABOUT THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
This survey consists of 10 questions about the
Sarbanes-Oxley and its impact on the accounting
profession. The survey was sent to 10 CPAs practicing in 
public accounting or in the industry; unfortunately only 4 
responses were received. However, Robert Half Management 
Resources, the world's premier provider of senior-level . 
accounting and finance professionals conducted also a 
survey covering the same subject, but focusing more on new 
corporate governance standards mandated by the Act, the 
survey included response from 1,400 chief financial 
officers (CFOs) from a stratified random sample of U.S. 
private companies with more than 20 employees. 58 percent 
of CFOs said they are implementing new practices in 
response to these regulations. Steps they reported taking 
include changing their firms' accounting procedures and 
enhancing their organizations' internal audit function. 
CFOs were asked, "In light of new corporate governance 
standards, what steps has your company taken or does it 
plan to take to ensure greater control of accounting 
processes?" Among the 58 percent who cited a specific 
action, their responses* were:
Review or change current accounting procedures 44% 
Create or expand internal audit function 36%
Hire an independent firm for consulting work 23% 
Restructure executive compensation plans 8%
Some other steps 2%.
The following three pages will include the 10 questions 
survey developed by the author and sent to 10 CPAs 
followed by the four response received.
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A survey about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
1. Does the accounting profession participate enough in 
the process of current accounting reform?
[J Yes Q No
2. In my opinion, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.....
| | Does hot go far enough | | Is fine
□ Goes too far
If your answer is "does not go far enough" or "goes 
too. far" , please explain why?
3. Do you think the current accounting standards need 
improvement ?
1 Yes | | No
If yes, in what directions?
4. How do you evaluate the new and increased penalties 
imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act?
I | Good enough | | Too harsh
| | Not tough enough
If your answer is "too harsh" or "not tough enough", 
please explain why.
5. Do you think the auditor independence rules 
introduced by the Act are sufficient to resolve 
current problems related to impaired independence?
I | They are sufficient | | Not sufficient
| | There is a need for new rules
If your answer is "not sufficient" or "need new 
rules", please explain why.
6. Section 408 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the 
SEC to conduct "regular and systematic" reviews of 
every public company at least once every three years
□ The requirements are realistic
[j The requirements are not realistic
If your answer is "nor realistic", please explain 
why.
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7. The Act requires that CEOs and CFOs must certify that 
the internal control system they have established 
provides them with all material information they need 
on a timely basis.
| | The requirements are appropriate
□ The requirements are not appropriate
If your answer is "not appropriate", explain why.
8. Before the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the 
self-regulated accounting profession was lacking 
discipline and quality control, in your judgment, did 
the Act provided the solution to correct these 
weaknesses?
I | Yes | | No
If your answer is "no", please explain why.
9. Do you think the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will have any 
significant impact on nonprofit organization?
□ Yes □ No
If your answer is "yes", please explain in what way.
10. Evaluate whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was effective 
in dealing with the inherited problems of the 
corporate governance.
I I The Act is very effective
I I The Act is somewhat effective
I I The Act is not effective at all .
If your answer is "not effective", please explain 
what is needed to be done.
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